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IN THE SUP'REME COURT 
OF THE STATE o~F UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Pla.int~ff and Res }JO ndc nt, 
-vs.-
HUGH F. ROWLEY and DONALU 
SPENCER, 
Defendants mul Appellants. 
Case No. 9894 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF T'HE CASE 
Tlw defendants were convicted of the crirnes of as-
sault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Section 76-7-6, 
e.C.A. 1953, and attempted burglary, in violation of See-
tions 76-1-30 and 76-9-3, U.C.A. 1953, and appeal from 
those convictions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that the con-
victions of the defendants should be affirmed. 
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STATE~1J1~XT OF FACTS 
The respondent subn1its the following state1uent of 
facts: On October 21, 1962, .at approximately 8:00 p.11l., 
:Jir. \~ere Lancaster, an employee of the J. C. Penney 
Company, went with his 15-year old son to the J. 8. 
Penney Store in Tooele to check the store to ascertain 
if everything was in proper order. ( R. 4). E pon entering 
the store, he noticed a small pile of shavings on the floor 
and a hole in the ceiling. (R. 6). Alarmed at this, he 
started to search the store when his son indicated that he 
heard .a sound like a brace being pulled from wood. (R. 
7). l-Ie told his son to call the police and then heard 
someone running. He went out into the alley behind the 
J. C. Penney Store where he saw a n1an who had appar-
ently jumped off the roof, holding .a revolver. (R. 7). 
Upon the burglar observing ~Ir. Lancaster, he fired at 
hi1n three tin1es, wounding ~Ir. Lancaster twice. (R. 8). 
}[r. Lancaster called for help and three men came out 
of Allen's Food Town, adjacent to the J. C. Penney Store. 
The burglar then fired in their direction, striking }lr. 
Sidney Srnith and :Mr. Dennis Jensen. }[r. Smith noticed 
that the burglar dropped his glasses as he fired in his 
direction. (R. 1±). lllr. S1nith retrieved these glas:)es and 
they were thereafter ,identified by Dr. Bruce J. Parsons, 
Optometrist, as being the glasses of the defendant, Don-
ald Spencer (R. 18), having unique ri1ns and the same 
prescription as glasses he had fitted for the defPndant 
Spencer. 
Ja1nes T. Portwood, a soldier stationed at Dugway 
Proving Grounds and residing in the I(irk Hotel (H. 32), 
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upon hearing the shots, looked out his window and ~.a w 
an individual with a revolver (R. 3-l:) who was li1nping 
badl;· (R. 35) get into a running car on the opposite side 
of the driver (R. 35) and drive away. The car was de-
scribed as a 1953 green and cream colored Dodge. (R. 
36). .Jlr. Portwood indicated that there were two men 
in the car as it was driven away. (R. 36). 
Police officials retrieved a spent slug in the vicinity 
of the J. C. Penney Store (R. 62), which "Was identified 
a~ a .357 l\fagnun1 bullet. Burglary equipment was re-
covered from the roof of the J. C. Penney Store. (R. 61). 
Additionally, heel prints were taken from the roof of the 
store as evidence. (R. 63). 
At approxiinatelr 9:00 P.M. on the same night, on 
the road from Tooele to Lehi, police officers stopped a 
1953 Dodge, ±-door, 2-toned "white and green automobile, 
having been alerted by l\Ir. Portwood as to the descrip-
tion. In the vehicle were the defendants Spencer and 
Rowle.'·· Spencer was armed with a .357 1Iagnuin pistol 
in his belt, and Rowley had a .38 caliber pistol in his 
belt. (R. -±-+ through 47). Officer Yincent exan1ined the 
pistol in the possession of Spencer and indicated that it 
smelled like it had been recently fired. At the time of 
the defendants being stopped by police officials, they 
were approximately -±7 miles from Tooele. (R. 56). :Mr. 
Portwood identified the vehicle as the car into which he 
had seen the man carrying the revolver enter after he 
had heard the shooting in Tooele. At the time of the 
arrest of the defendants, the appellant Spencer walked 
with a limp and appeared to have a badly swollen ankle. 
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(R. 71). The footprjnts taken frmn the J. C. Penney 
Store m.atched the shoes of the defendant Rowley in 
depth, width, na1ne and design. ( R. 66). At the time the 
defendants were stopped they had in their possession ad-
ditional ammunition, wood punches and small chisels. 
The defendant Spencer, who was driving, wa:s searched, 
and it was revealed that his driver's license called for 
adequate glasses, which he was not wearing. ( R. -19). 
The defendant Spencer took the stand, admitted be-
ing in Tooele on the night in question, but stated it wa::; 
later in the evening, adJ:nitted that he was in Tooele with 
Rowley (R. 78), but stated that he did not cmnmit the 
crime. He said that he had the pistol in his possession 
because he had been doing some shooting earlier that 
day, and that he put the gun in his belt when he sa\v the 
road block. ( R. 82-83). He said that he had done this 
because he was an ex convict, having two felony convic-
tions (R. 79), and felt that it would cause him difficulty 
if they found guns in the car. The defendant said he had 
lost the glasses that Dr. Parsons had prescribed and 
prepared for him (R. 78), and that the glasses that \Yere 
adrnitted as Exhibit 7 were not his. Alice Beckstead, 
with whom the defendant said he had been earlier in 
the day, testified that at the time she was with him he 
\Vas wearing glasses. ( R. 91). The defense counsel, at 
the conclusion of the appellant Spencer's testimony, 
made the following proposed stipulation: 
"MR. HANSEN: We would like to make a 
stipulation in regard to a pDlygraph test with the 
defendant, Hugh Rowley. 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~Iay it be stipulated, Robert McManarna, an 
officer in the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
gave a polygraph test to Hugh Rowley, that ~fr. 
McManama is a qualified person to give such 
examination; that :Mr. Rowley denied he had any-
thing to do with these particular offenses, and 
that Officer l\1cManama was of the opinion he 
was not telling ~the truth when he made these 
statements : 
It is also requested that the District Attor-
ney stipulate at the present time, the degree of 
accuracy of the polygraph tests is approximately 
99 degrees accurate. 
May it be so stipulated~ 
MR. BLACK: We are certainly agreeable to 
that stipulation, your Honor." 
The stipulation as to the results of the polygraph test 
were agreed to by the prosecution even though the stipu-
lation was offered by the defense. 
Prior to the tilne of trial, the defendants filed a 
notice of alibi and a request for a polygraph exan1ina-
tion. (File Xo. 811). The defense counsel further entered 
into a written stipulation with the prosecution requesting 
the polygraph exanrination and requesting that the re-
sults thereof be introduced into evidence, and indicating 
that he had explained the import of the examination and 
the stipulation to the defendants. (File No. 881). The 
trial court, after the receipt of all the testimony and evi-
dence, instructed the jury, and no exceptions to the in-
structions appear of record. The iury returned a verdict 
of guilty and the defendanti-l were committed to the Stat<' 
Prison. 
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ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANTS HAVE NO BASIS TO CLAIM ANY 
ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE READING OF THE INFOR-
MATION SINCE: 
A. THERE IS A PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS UNLESS AFFIRMA-
TIVELY PROVED TO THE CONTRARY AND NO 
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE APPEARS TO REFUTE 
THE PRESUMPTION. 
B. APPELLANTS WAIVED ANY ERROR BY FAIL-
ING TO OBJECT. 
C. ANY SUCH ERROR WAS A MINOR IRREGULARITY 
THAT COULD NOT HAVE PREJUDICED THEIR 
CASE. 
The appellants contend that there was a failure, at 
trial, to read the information and plea of ~the appellants 
to the jury, and that this was such an error as to vitiate 
their convictions. It is sub1nitted that there was no such 
error. The transcript of the trial reflects that the re-
porter 1nerely sun1marized the proceedings that occurred 
in impaneling 'the jury and failed to 1nention that the 
information was read. There does not appear to have 
been an~· objection frmn defense counsel, which absence 
would indicate regularity. ~-\_dditionally, no confusion 
or questioning frmn the jury appears of record ·which 
would support a conclusion that the inforn1ation was not 
read. No affinnative proof appears of record that would 
result in a conclusion that the provisions of 76-31-1, 
U.C.A. 1953, requiring the reading of the information 
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and plea, were not con1plied with. In 1 Wharton's Crilni-
nal Evidence, Sec. 126, it is noted: 
"It is rebuttably presumed that the variou~ 
phases of a criminal prosecution have conformed 
to the requirements of the law. *** 
''All judicial proceedings in courts of general 
jurisdiction are presumed to be correct and regu-
lar, in the .absence of proof to the contrary. * * * 
"Irregularities or error in the proceedings of 
courts are never presumed, but must be affirma-
t~vely shown." (Emphasis supplied) 
See also Abbott, CTiminal Trial Practice, -1-th Ed., 
Sec. 362. 
In the instant case, where the record is sum1narized, 
.and nothing appears therein that would support a show-
ing of a failure to properly conduct the appellants' trial, 
it must be presumed that proper trial requirements were 
fully complied with. In State v. Reay, 13 l~tah 2d 79, 368 
P.2d 595 (19·62) this court considered a contention that 
error had been committed in reading to the jury an in-
formation for robbery and being an habitual crin1inal 
before convietion on the robbery charge. The court re-
jected the contention, noting: 
"The defendant would have us infer from the 
foregoing that both courts were read t~o the jury 
which would have been error. However, such .an 
inference is not justified. In the absence of a 
showing to the contrary, it is presumed that judi-
cial proceedings were regular in all respects. 
There is no affirmative showing that the second 
count of the information was re.ad to the jury at 
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the start of the trial upon the first charge. The 
record is devoid of any objection being made with 
respect to the reading of the information." 
Consequently, in the instant case where the reporter 
has obviously summarized the record, the presu1nption 
of regularity of judicial proceedings requires a conclu-
sion that there is no basis for error. 
Secondly, it is submitted that even were such an 
error committed, the appellants 1nay not complain, be-
cause they failed to object to the irregularity at the time 
of its occurrence or any tilne during trial. In 2-1 C.J.S., 
Cnminal Law, § 1673 ( 4), it is noted that as a general 
rule the failure to object to an irregularity will be deem-
ed a waiver, and it is stated: 
"The general rule has been applied to objec-
tions that the indictn1ent was not read to the jury. 
* * '~" 
Numerous courts have ruled ·that the failure to ob-
ject to an irregularity in the reading of an indictment or 
inforrnation constitutes a waiver. Dabney r. Comnwn-
wealth, :226 K~y. 119, 10 S."\V. 2d 612 (1928); Crag 1:. 
Com:JnOnLcealth, 5 Ky. L. 329; People v. 1lloonstan, 17 
Cal. Rptr. 79 (1961); Orner 1'. State, 78 Tex. Cr. -115, 183 
S."\V. 1172 (1916). 
Finally, it is submitted that even were the appellants 
in a position to claim error, any failure to read the in-
fonnation would at best be hannless error. It is, of 
course, acknowledged that the purpose of the reading 
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of the infonuation and plea is to apprise the jury of the 
fort1woming proceedings, State u. Solomon, 93 Utah 70, 
71 P.:2d 10-l: (1937), but where no obvious confusion ex-
isted, where opening argun1ents were rnade, closing argu-
ments given, and instructions rendered, it could hardiy 
be said that the accuseds were prejudiced. In State 'li. 
Telford, 89 Utah 22, 56 P.2d 1362 (1936), a claim of error 
was presented before this court based upon a failure of 
the court to read or state the plea of the defendant of 
''former conviction" t!o the information of persistent 
liquor law violations. This court held the faliure to be 
error, but then stated that the failure must be weighed 
for specific prejudice. The court found that there was 
none, noting: 
''It appears, therefore, that the proof tender-
ed in support of the plea of former conviction 
was in1material and would not have supported 
it. Failure to read or state to the jury a plea in 
regard to which there was no evidence to support 
it is not prejudicial." 
Two things should be observed from the Telford 
case. First, the court expressly noted that the objection 
was taken which would preserve the issue for appellate 
review and disallow a presumption of regularit~r, and, 
secondly, that the court determined that no prejudice 
occurred. 
In 24A C.J.S., Criminal Laze, § 1898, p. 937, 1958, it 
is stated: 
"A conviction will not be reversed for errors 
occurring in the conduct of the trial, where not-
-withstanding the errors, substantial justice has 
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been done accused. The rule has been applied to 
alleged errors as to: * * * reading, or failure to 
read, the statute, indictment, or plea to the jury.'' 
:\[any cases have failed to find prejudice from the 
failure to read an information: State v. Dawson, 2+5 
Iowa 747, 6·3 N.W. 2d 917 (1954); People v. Ross, 98 C.~-\. 
2d 805, 221 P.2cl 280 (1950); State 1./. Ayres, 70 Ida. 18, 
211 P.2d 1-±2. In Dabney v. Commonu·ealth, 226 Ky. 119, 
10 S. W. 2d 612 ( 1928), the court considered a matter 
identical with that urged here and refused to find error, 
noting: 
"* * * It [the record] further shows that both 
sides announced ready f.or trial, and a jury was 
impaneled and sworn. The bill of exceptions mani-
fests that counsel for the commonwealth and the 
defendant respectively stated the case to the jury. 
The testimony was fully heard and strictly con-
fined to the issue made by the indic;hnent and the 
plea of not guilty. The jury was adequately in-
structed, and a verdict returned, responding liter-
ally to ·the charge, saying: 
'We, the jury, find the defendant, Roy 
Dabney, guilty as charged in the indictment, 
and fix his punishment 'at two years in the 
state penitentiary.' 
"No objections or exceptions on the part of 
the defendant to a failure, if there was a failure, 
to read the indictment to the jury or to state his 
plea, appear in the bill of exceptions. The bill of 
exceptions does not show affinnatively any such 
omission. 
* * * 
"The purpose of the law is fully satisfied 
when the defendant is informed of the issue which 
10 
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he has to meet, and the jury is advised of the 
charge it is called upon to try." 
Certainly whe·re the Pvidence of guilt is as conclu-
sive as it is in the instant case, no prejudice can be 
clailned. 77-42-1, U.C.A. 19·53. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANTS CAN CLAIM NO PREJUDICE 
FROM THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY WITH REFERENCE TO RECEIPT OF A STIPULA-
TION, PROPOSED AND OFFERED BY DEFENSE COUN-
SEL, ON THE RESULTS OF A LIE DETECTOR TEST. 
The appellants contend that the trial court commit-
ted error in failing to give an instruetion on the stipu-
lated results of a polygraph test given to the defendant 
Hugh F. Rowley. 1 The lie detector test was perforrned 
on Rowley by his own request. The trail defense coun-
sel filed on January 11, 1963 a "Request for Polygraph 
Examinations" on behalf of both defendants, which 
stated: 
"The above defendants and witness named 
hereby reques~t polograph exa1ninations to aid in 
determining the truthfulness of their a1ihi and 
their declarations of innocense and stipulate the 
results thereof and any stateinents made in the 
course thereof may be admitted in e·vidence." 
On January 21, 19·63, the defendants filed a stipula-
tion, which stated: 
"In aid of their defenses to the charge of at-
tempted second degree burglary and assault with 
a deadly weapon alleged to have been committed 
11 
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in Tooele, City, Utah on or about the 21st day of 
October 1962, they request that a polygraph test 
be given to Hugh Rowley and that regardless of 
results thereof said results may be used either 
by themselves individually or jointly or by the 
State 'Of Utah and they herein specifically request 
and consent to the introduction in evidence of the 
polygraph test as evidence in their trial by them-
selves or by the District Attorney in the rrhird 
Judicial District Court of Utah, in and for Tooele 
County." 
Thereafter, a statement of defense counsel appeared 
under the stipulation, which stated: 
"Comes now Robert B. Hansen, Attorney for 
both of the above named defendants, and alleges 
that he has explained the legal import of the above 
to each of the defendants prior to their executing 
their stipulation above and further affirms that 
they entered into such stipulation upon advise of 
counsel and without any undue influence or coer-
cion and did so voluntarily. The undersigned 
as their attorney further agrees and consents to 
said stipulation." 
Thereafter, the District Attorney c-onsented to the 
stipulation in a one-line acknowledgment. 
At the tin1e of trial, defense counsel, not the prose-
cution, offered the stipulation as to Rowley. The stipula-
tion was merely that Rowley had denied any connection 
with the offenses, and that the polygraph operator was 
of the opinion that the defendant was not telling the 
truth. 
1. It should be noted as to this matter that any error that 
might exist is limited to the defendant Rowley. 
12 
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~·o instruction "·as tendered by the appellant nor 
was any exception taken to the failure to give an instruc-
tion. The appellant relies upon an advisory opinion of 
the AriZiona Supreme Court, State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 
:n.t, 371 P.2d 894 (1962), wherein that court, upon cer-
tification after conviction, and without weighing for 
error, laid down some guidelines for handling the ad-
mission on stipulation of the results of lie detector tests. 
The court said the trial court should instruct the jury 
on its purpose and weight. It did not state that the fail-
ure to do so would be prejudicial error ·or consider the 
que·stion of the absence of an instruction ·or exception. 
Several recent cases have allowed the use of stipu-
lated testin1ony on the results of a lie detector test, ap-
parently allowing their adlnissibility without reference 
to limiting instructions. State v. 1ll eN arnara, 104 N.\V. 
2d 568 (Iowa 1960); People l.·. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 
686, 193 p .2d 937. 
Consequently, unless there is some substantial preju-
dice, no error should be allowed to be claimed, especially 
where the appellant ·was the moving force for the admii5-
sion of the testimony, and failed to tender instructions 
or request any. To now, for the first time on appeal, 
allow the appellant to claim error, would allow hi1n to 
benefit hy self-induced error. In State v. Rivenlmrgh, 
11 t~tah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960), this court noted: 
'•It is of course not error for the court not 
to give an instruction where it is not asked. This 
assignment of error is without 1nerit." 
13 
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In State 'L 1lliller, 111 l'tah ~33, 177 P.:2<l 7:27 (19-l-7). 
this court "'as presented with a clain1 that the trial court 
committed error for failing to instruct on the limited 
purpose of the use of the defendant's confession. No rP-
quest for such an instruction had been n1ade. The court 
noted: 
"This requirement that the court instruct 
'upon the law applicable to the case' does not 
place upon the court alone the burden of making 
up instructions which cover every question which 
may have arisen in the case. 
"The general rule is that unless the party 
requests an instruction on a special matter he 
cannot predicate error upon the court's failure 
to charge. * * * The tenor of the cases we have 
considered, and here cite, support our holding 
that this case cannot be returned for a new trial 
because of the court's fiailure to give a proper 
instruction lilniting the use of ~filler's confession 
when no such instruction 'vas requested. ***" 
This has long been the rule of la-w in this jurisdiction. 
State r. Anderson, 108 Ftah 130, 158 P.:2d 1:27: People 
v. Robinson, G Utah 101, 21 Pac. 403; State v. TVoodall, 
6 Ftah :2d 8, 305 P.2d 473: State v. Peterson, 1:21 Utah 
229, 240 P.2d 50-t. 
Additionally, where no exception was taken to fail-
1UP to instruct on the effect of lie-detector evidenre, no 
error can be daimed. State v. Ferguson, 83 Utah 357, 28 
P.2d 175 (1934); Abbott, Cri1ninal Trial Practice, 4th 
Ed. Sec. 672. 
Consequently, appellant Rowley is without a merit-
orious clailn on this point. 
14 
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POINT III. 
APPELLANT CAN CLAIM NO ERROR FROM THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON ATTEMPTED BURGLARY 
SINCE: 
A. NO EXCEPTION WAS TAKEN. 
B. THE ERROR COMPLAINED OF IS NOT APPLIC-
ABLE TO THIS CASE. 
C. NO PREJUDICE COULD HAVE RESULTED. 
The appellants contend that the trial court erred in 
it~ instruction on the elements of the law of atten1pt. The 
appellants contend that the court should have instructed 
on the failure to consummate the offense. It is submitted 
that there is no merit to the appellants' contentions.2 
First, it is submitted th!at the appellants have no 
basis to object, since no exception was ta:ken to the in-
struction given. 77-37-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides that ex-
ceptions to instructions shall he "taken and preserved 
as in civil cases." The general rule is said to preclude a 
review of instructions unless an exception has preserved 
the contention for review ·on appeal. Thus it is noted 
in Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, .fth Ed., Sec. 672: 
"The correctness of instructions given or re-
fused cannot be questioned in the appellate court 
unless a tin1ely exception was saved in the trial 
court *** ." 
2. This issue of claimed error goes only to the conviction 
of the crime of attempted second degree burglary. 
15 
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The Utah eases have given force to this rule. In State 
r. Smith, +3 Utah 381, 14-G Pae. 286 (1915), it \Ya~ said: 
"So it would require hard struggling to de-
fend and support portions of the charge, both as 
to substance and consistency * * *. But there 
is no exception, no assignment, and no elai1n m1ade 
as to this nor to any portion of the charge. \V e 
thus leave that." 
In State 'L Ferguson, 83 l-tah 35'7, 28 P.:Z(l 1/;) 
(1934), it was said: 
"Other errors are assigned to instructions 
given to the jury, but, as no exceptions theret'o 
appear of record, they, of course cannot be con-
sidered." 
Subsequent decisions have modified the ~tric.t t>xeep-
tion rule noted above. Thus, in State v. Cabo, 90 rtah 
89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), it was said: 
"\Y e wish not to depart frmn the rule laid 
down in this jurisdictioon that in ordinary cases on 
appeal errors relating to instructions or refusing 
requests to instruct will not be considered or re-
viewed unless exceptions thereto were properly 
taken by the party cmnplaining. But in capital 
cases and in eases of grave and serious charged 
offenses and convictions of long terms of im-
pris-onment, cases involving the life and liberty 
of the citizen, we think that when palpable error 
is made to appear on the face of the record and 
to the manifest prejudice of the accused, the court 
has the power to notice such error and to correct 
the same, though no fonnal exception was taken 
to the ruling. * * *" 
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Later cases have also given recognition to the possible 
exct>ption. J::Jtate 1/. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P.2d 
504; State v. Hines, 6 U.2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957). 
The precedent, therefore, will excuse the failure to take 
an exception only if the error is palpable and so flagrant 
as to deny a fair trial. 
It is submitted that the instruction given was nort so 
palpably erroneous as to warrant a claim orf error in the 
absence of an exception. If the court had instructed dif-
ferently and included a phrase on the failure to consurn-
mate the offense, it could not have helped the appellants. 
76-1-30, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
''Any act done with intent to comn1it a crime, 
and tending hut failing to effect its CJOlmnission, 
is an attempt to commit .a crime. Any person may 
be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, al-
though it a;ppe.ars on the trial that the crime in-
tended or attempted was perpetrated by such per-
son in pursuance of such attempt, unless the court, 
in i h; discretion, discharges the jury and directs 
such person to be tried for such crime." 
The above statute allows the conviction of an accused 
for atten1pt even where it .appears from the evidence that 
the crin1e was consurnmated. In the instant case, the 
evidence shows that the appellants had already bored 
two holes into the building. This is sufficient to consti-
tute "entry" and to consumrn.ate the offense. Thus, in 
Clark & ~larshall, Crimes, 6th Ed. (1958), it is noted: 
"·The slightest entry, however, is sufficient 
if it be with felonious intent. * * * It need not 
be of any part of the body, but an entry n1ay be 
rnade by an instn1n1ent where the instru1nent is 
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inserted for the purpose of cmnn1itting the felony. 
* * *" 
In State v. Crawford, 8 K.D. 539, 80 K.\\ .... 193 
(1899), the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the 
boring into a grainery and the insertion of the auger 
into the grainery w'as sufficient entry to make out the 
crnne. 
Thus, appellants would argue that, if the crirne were 
not interrupted and consummated, they would be entitled 
to a;cquittal of the attempt charge. This was true at 
common la,v, but in states having statutes lrke ours, con-
surnmation is no defense. Consequently, there is no rea-
son to instruct on such an issue. A careful analy:-:is of 
the law in this area supports a view that where consum-
mation of the crime rnay still be punished as an attempt, 
the absence of conslunnration is not a part of the crirne. 
Thus, Clark & Marshall, Cri-me.s, 6th Ed., § +.1 + ( 193S). 
correctl;r states: 
"Because of the dominating idea that an e:s-
sential elernent of a criminal atternpt lies in the 
failure to consurnmate the target crime aimed at 
by the accused, questions have arisen when such 
crime has been completed whether there can be a 
conviction for an attempt. This situation is typi-
fied by People v. Lardner. 'There the ac.cused 
was indicted for larceny, and the only evidence 
offered by the prosecution est'ablished proof of 
larceny, but a verdict of 'attempt to cmnmit lar-
ceny' was returned. Reversing the judgment and 
remanding the case, the Illinois court stated: 'A 
failure to consummate the crime is as rnuch an 
essential element of an attempt as the intent and 
the performance of an overt act toward its com-
18 
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Inission. Evidence that a cri1ne has been com-
Initted will not sustain a verdict for an attempt 
to cmn1nit it, be0ause the essential element of in-
terception or prevention of execution is lacking.' 
While the Lardner court recognized the theory 
that where an indictment charges an offense 
which includes ( § 2.03) a lesser offense a defend-
ant acquitted of the higher offense may be con-
victed of the lesser, it refused application of 
that rule to statutory .attempts 'because an essen-
tial element of the attempt is a failure to consum-
Inate the crime.' 
"In short, the Illinois court held, in substance, 
that only behavior described as 'a direct ineffect-
ual act toward the commission of crime' is within 
the ambit of the statute proscribing and punish-
ing attempts ; that consummation of the crime, 
larceny in this case, took Lardner's behavior out 
of the reach of the statutory definition of at-
tempt. 
"But a different result can he reached' in 
jurisdictions \vhere there is a general statutory 
provision running in the tern1s of Rule 31, Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz. : an ac-
cused 'may he found guilty of an offense neces-
~arily included in the offense charged or of an 
atte1npt to commit either the offense charged' or 
an offense ne1cessarily included therein if the at-
tenlpt is an offense.' Jones v. State is a state 
case, decided under a statutory provision similar 
to the FedePal Rule, where' the defendant was in-
dicted and tried for rape and convicted of an at-
tempt to commit that felony. Jones admitted the 
act but claimed the female consented. His convic-
tion was affirmed although the court recognized 
the fact that the crime was consum1nated. This 
decision rests primarily on the express statutory 
language. 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"At connnon law there could be no conviction 
where the intended (target) crime was completed. 
The difference between decisions following Jones 
and those adopting the Lardner view lies in ex-
press legislative approval of convictions for at-
tempts though the crime aimed at was c01npleted, 
e.g., committed. Such legislation frequentl.'· 
makes the crime of an 'attempt to' an included 
crime and permits conviction for a lesser offense. 
In J·ones, supra, there is a conviction of a lesser 
( c01npared with rape) offense, e.g., an attempt to 
commit a felony. Of course, the problems of mer-
ger of offenses and former jeopardy can, and do, 
arise in these situations." 
Perkins, Criminal Law (1958), p. 477, analyzes the 
very proposition urged in the instant case by appellants 
and rejects it as an absurdity. It is stated: 
"* * * ·To insure against such a conclusion a 
number of the statutes expressly provide that a 
person may be convicted of an attempt to c01nn1it 
a crime although it appears on the trial that the 
crime attempted was perpetrated by the defend-
ant. It has been rather common to authorize con-
viction of an attempt to con1mit the crime charged 
in the indictment. This type of statute does not 
expressly authorize conviction of an attempt 
"rhere the proof shows success, - nor does it ex-
pressly exclude it. Such a provision does not re-
quire submission of the attempt issue where there 
is no evidence to warrant it. A defendant who 
has been convicted of the offense charged is not 
entitled to a reversal by reason of the judge's re-
fusal to submit the attempt issue where there 
was no evidence of an atte1npt that failed. The 
real test comes at another point. Suppose in such 
a trial the uncontradicted evidence shows beyond 
doubt that defendant attempted to commit the of-
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fense charged, but there is conflict in the testi-
mony as to whether the attempt succeeded or 
failed. Smne of the statements on the subject, if 
carried to their logical conclusion, would entitle 
the defendant to an instruction which would tell 
the jury in substance: (1) they must acquit the 
defendant of the completed offense unless satis-
fied beyond a reasonable doubt that the attempt 
was successful; (2) they must acquit the defend-
ant of an attempt to commit the offense unless 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the at-
tempt failed. In other words the position would 
be that defendant is entitled to a verdict of not 
guilty if there is doubt in regard to success or 
failure although no doubt that the attempt was 
made. There is no proper basis for such a posi-
tion, and probably no court would carry the un-
sound notion to such an absurd extreme." 
Clearly, therefore, the court committed no error in 
failing to instruct on consummation, and especially so 
\\·here the Utah statute would render the instruction er-
roneous, and no exception was taken to the instruction 
given. The Utah statute was apparently taken frorn Cali-
fornia which has a substantively identical provision, 
Cal. Penal Code § 663. California courts have taken the 
position that there are only two elements to the crime 
of atten1pt: (1) a specific intent to com1nit the principal 
c-rime, and (:2) a direct act towards the co1nn1ission of 
the crime. The California Suprerne Court has recognized 
that failure to consumn1ate the cri1ne is no longer an 
element of attempt under the California statute, Peo1Jle 
v. Tkur·man, 62 C.A.1-!7, 216 Pac. 394 (1923): 
"* * * In the absenee of such a permis~·:ive 
statutory provision as that which is eontained in 
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section 663 of our Penal Code, it has been held 
that where a defendant is charged ·with an at-
tempt to comrnit a crin1e he cannot be convicted 
if the evidence shows that he actually consum-
mated the crirne. * * *" 
See Per.kins, Criminal Attempt and Related Pro!J-
lems, 2 U.C.L.A., L. Rev. 319 (1D33). 
In State v. Lore, 210 La. 11, :W So. 2d 13G (1946), 
the Louisiana Supre1ne Court considered the new Louisi-
ana statute silimar to that of Utah, and stated: 
"Failure of consummation is not an essential 
element of such an attempt. Under paragraph 
three an attempt is not merged in the completed 
offense, and a person m.ay be convicted of an at-
tempt to comrnit a crirne, if it appears on the trial 
that the crime was actually consummated." 
The appellants contend that State L". Priuce, 73 rtah 
205, :2S-b Pac. 108 ( 1930), supports their position. Al-
though the Prince ease has some dicta language in it 
that might seen1 to the contrary, the ease does not rneet 
the issue presented in this case. In Prince, the only is:-:ue 
relevant to this c.ase was an instruction given hy the 
trial court on the le·sser included offense of attempted 
extortion, where extortion was the offense charged. 
There the court properly instructed on the failure to con-
summate the principal offense, a problen1 not here in-
volved. See quote from Perkins, infra p. 20. This court 
approved the instruction, saying it 'vas not erroneous, 
.and in doing so 1nerely noted the conlillon law eiements 
of atternpt, quoting Corpus Juris. The court was not 
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concerned with whether a failure of consunnnation is an 
ele1nent of attempt under the Utah statute where an at-
tempt is charged and the evidence borders on consumma-
tion of the cri1ne. Thus the case did not concern itself 
with the legal issue present in this ca:se, and did not 
analyze the Ftah statute against a similar fact situation. 
Consequently, the Prince case hardly can be called pre-
cedent for the proposition now being urged on appeal. 
Finally, it is submitted that no prejudice can be 
claimed in view of the overwhehning evidenee of guilt of 
at least an attempt, and the fa:et tha:t an attempt is the 
least offense of which the .appellants eould be convicted. 
Obviously, they were not harmed. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT COlVIlVIITTED NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE LAW OF PRINCI-
PALS. 
The appellants contend that the trial court erred 
m giving instruction 5-C relating to principals. (File 
X o. 809). In the argument in their brief, however, the 
claim of error is not direeted hy appellants to .any par-
ticular appellant. 
\Yhat has previously been stated before with refer-
ence to the need of the appellants to have taken excep-
tions to the court's instruction is .applicable in the in-
stant case. Since no exception \vas taken to the instruc-
tion, no clajm of error can be urged before this eourt, 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
s1nce obviously the instruction was not so palpabl~~ Pr-
roneous that it denied the appellants a fair trial. 
Even so, the whole of the instruction given should 
be examined to asce-rtain if it resulted in prejudice to 
the defendants or either of then1, and should also be 
examined against the totality of the instructions and 
weighed for specific prejudice. State v. Siddotcay, 61 
Utah 189, 211 Pac. 9()8 (1922). The full instruction given 
in the instant case was : 
"You are instructed that all persons con-
cerned in the cmnmission of the crime whether 
they directly commit the act constituting the of-
fense, or aid and abet in its cmnmission are prin-
cipals in any crime cmnmitted, and are guilty of 
committing such offense. 
"In this connection when you conS'ider the ele-
lnents of the crime of attempted burglary in the 
second degree, if you believe beyond a reasonable 
doubt that one of the defendants did the act con-
stituting such offense, and that the other defend-
ant knowingly aided and abetted such person in 
the conunission of said attempted burglary in 
the second degree, then each of the defendants 
would be guilty of such offense. 
"In this connection you are instructed that 
·when you consider the evidence of the offense 
of assault with a deadly weapon, if you believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
Spencer actually did the shooting, and performed 
all of the requirements for said offense, and that 
the defendant Rowley was knowingly aiding and 
abetting said Spencer in the commission of such 
offense, then the defendant Rowley and the de-
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fendant Spencer would each be guilty of such of-
fense." 
Thus the court did not merely limit the instruction 
to an abstract principle of law, but rather in accord with 
previous directions from this court, it tailored the in-
struction to 1neet the particular evidentiary issues raised 
at trial. State v. Thompson, 110 l~tah 113, 170 P.2d 153. 
The appellant contends that the decision of this court 
in State L·. Baunt, -17 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518 (1915), sup-
ports the position that the court's instruction in the in-
stant case was erroneous. In the Baum case the defend-
ant was convicted of burglary. It appeared that the de-
fendant entered the building in question and removed 
goods therefron1. Thus the evidence in the Baum case 
specifically showed the participation of the defendant, 
and m.ade the instruction as to aiding and abetting the 
commission of the crime erroneous. The facts of the 
instant case are not of that nature. In the Baum case 
this court noted of the instruction given, which is similar 
of the first paragraph of the instruction given in this 
ea~e: 
"Such a charge may be proper enough in a 
proper case. ~ ~ *" 
Thus the court noted there was nothing inherently 
erroneous in the instruction given, and indicated ·where 
the facts warrant it such an instruction is proper. In thP 
instant case the evidence was not clear as to the at-
tempted burglary charge as to what part each defendant 
played. The evidence showed both defendants as being 
present, but it did not show what part tlH-'Y specifically 
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played in cutting into the roof, using the· tools, etc. An 
inference of joint participation based upon circumstan-
tial e~idence, including the fact that Rowley as well m; 
Spencer ·were anned, and Rowley apparently drove the 
vehicle in aid of their escape frmn the scene of the crime 
and was also pre·sent at the scene, was enough to war-
rant ·an instruction being given on the law of prineipals. 
In addition, it should be noted that the court i:ipecifically 
tailored the instruction on principals to fit Rowley's sit-
uation on the question of assault with a deadly weapon. 
His presence was only circum:stantially shown, whereas 
Spencer's direet commission of the act was apparent. 
Rowley's participation was also shown by his operating 
the escape vehicle, and carrying a gun. This demon-
strates that he acted in concert with Spencer. Conse-
quently, the instruction, carefully drawn as it ,,~a~, 
was absolutely correct. In People L Piane.z::.i, 42 C.A. 
2d 270, 108 P. 2d 685 (1940), a murder case, a similar 
fact situation raised a similar objection. The California 
court failed to find any in1proprety, and stated: 
"The instructions set forth in paragraphs (e) 
and (f) of defendant's fifth proposition were like-
wise properly read to the jury. Frmn the evi-
dence in the present case it appears that two or 
n1ore pers·ons participated in the murders of 
which defendant stands convicted. The court, 
therefore, properly gave an instruction in the 
language of section 971 of the Penal Code, for 
it nray be that the jury believed from the evidence 
that defendant did not fire the shot which killed 
decedent Greuzard but that one of the other par-
ticipants in the crime did so, and that defendant 
aided and abetted in the commission of the of-
fense." 
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A si1nilar result was reached in Schreiuer v. People, 
360 P. :2d -!-!3 (Colo. 1961), where the Colorado court 
commented: 
""'" * ~· It is obvious that coloring this entire 
assignment of error is the belief that because, the 
People's theory of the case ·was that defendant 
was physically present in the pharmacy, .an in-
struction on accessory is thereby rendered in-
applicable. Such is not the law. T'he statute 
quoted, supra, clearly states that one who is 
present .and aids, abets or assists is deemed, con-
sidered and punished as a principal. \Vhere, as 
here, two persons are acting in concert, one hold-
ing the victims at bay, the other emptying the 
cash register, an instruction on accessory is in 
order. In the a;bsence of such .an instruction the 
jury might conceivably acquit the one who held 
the victims at bay in the mistaken belief that since 
he did not personally ta:ke the money from the 
register he was therefore innocent of the charge 
of robbery. It has long been the law in Colorado 
that an accessory who stands by and aids in the 
perpetration of a crime may properly be charged 
as .a principal, and in the case of co-defendants it 
is unnecessary to spell out which one is the prin-
cipal and which the accessory, nor is it necessary 
to chara:cterize and classify the specific acts of 
each. * * *" 
Clearly, where the' evidence in the instant case in-
ferentially raises a probability of guilt by virtue of being 
an aiding principal, the 'jnstruction was proper. 
Finally, it is submitted no prejudice could occur 
even if such instructon were deerned errone~ous. Wilson 
'~"· StatP, 150 Xeb. 436, 34 N.vV. :2cl 880 (1948). 
It is obvious that appellants have no clain1 for re-
versal on this point. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants have raised several claims of error, all 
of Which are raised for the first tin1e on appeal, and 
all of which, when analyzed for legal merit and compared 
against the factual certainty of the guilt of the appel-
lants, demonstrates only that the jury rendered a proper 
verdict in accordance with due process and es:-;ential 
justice. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully :submitted, 
A. PRATT !(ESLER, 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Chief Assistant Atty. Gent-ral 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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